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Table 1
'Normal' Food 'Balance* Position 
(tonnes grain equivalent)
Basic Requirement1 4,500,000 (100%)
Domestic Production 2,750,000 (61%)
Urban (Zonas Verdes) 150,000 (3%)
Household Consumed (50,000) (1%)
Commercialised (100,000) (2%)
Rural 2,600,000 (57%)
Household Consumed (2,200,000) (48%)
Commercialised - 
Formal and Informal (400,000) (19%)
Imports 625,0002 (14%)
Food Aid (500,000) (11%)
Commercial/Parallel (125,000) (2%)
Food Deficit 1.125,000 (25%)
Urban/Rural Breakdown
Basic Requirement3
Domestic Production 
Urban 
Rural
Household Consumed 
Commercialised
Imports2
Food Deficit4
Urban
1,080,000
500.000
(150.000)
(350.000) 
( 50,000)
(450.000)
400.000
Rural
3.420.000
2.250.000
( - )
(2.250.000)
(2 .200.000) 
(50,000)
225,000
(180,000) (17%) 945,000 (27%)
Based on 12,500,000 population estimate.
Probably understates total imports. May be 125,000 tonnes additional 
border imports from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi consumed 
in adjoining rural districts or nearby towns. Transborder exports to 
Malawi and Tanzania - not estimated - may be up to 50,000 tonnes.
These are from areas - e.g. Angonia, Northern Mueda Plateau with poor 
transport links with the rest of Mozambique.
Based on 3,000,000 urban and 9,500,000 rural
On average 27% - leaving supplies just above borderline famine level -
seems plausible. Some districts - especially in Nampula, Zambesia, 
Sofala - are near famine borderline even in normal weather years but 
others - especially in Maputo, Inhambane, Nampula (interior), Sofala 
(Beira Corridor), and Cabo Delgado (Mueda Plateau) have significant 
surpluses. Affectados are in general in a borderline famine position. 
Given the high levels of moderate and severe urban malnutrition the
urban 17% also appears reasonable.
2Table 2
Food Aid: Uses and Losses
(tonnes)1
Food Aid Received2 500,000 - 600,000
Uses
Abasticimento and Relatives -
Consumers3 100,000 - 125,000
Bread4 67,500 - 90,000
Desplacodos/Af feetados5 150,000 - 175,000
Public Institutions5 50,000 - 75,000
Food for Work and Relatives2 20,000 — 30,000
Total Intended Uses3 387,500 — 495,000 (83%)
Losses (375,000) - (450,000) (75%)
Never Received3 10,000 — 12,500
War Loss10 10,000 - 15,000
Riot/Disorder Losses11 5,000 - 10,000
(Sub-Total) (25,000) - (37,500) (6%)
Port Losses 50,000 - 60,000
(Of Which - Normal)12 (10,000) - (17,500)
Legal Transfer from
Abasticimento13 10,000 - 20,000
Diversion To Pastry14 7,500 - 10,000
Distribution Losses15 25,000 - 30,000
(Of Which - Normal)15 (10,000 - 12,500)
Total Losses1"7 117,500 - 160,000 (26%)
Total 'Abnormal' Losses13 62,000 - 72,500 (12%)
Notes
1. Stylized Ranges 1988-1991
2. Actual Deliveries (subject to Note 9). Pledge usually significantly 
higher.
3. Estimated backwards from consumer surveys. Maputo and Beira are
"abasticimento" (fair price shop) proper. Other towns have same 
prices but no ration card back-up.
4. Wheat deliveries to bakers used for bread. (See Note 14.)
5. Estimated from distribution point (basically camps and NGOs) data.
Losses beyond that point not directly deducted.
6. Health, Education, Social Welfare, etc. No direct estimate leakages 
within or between institutions.
7. ILO, UNICEF, NGO, Enterprise.
8. ( ) figure allows for losses/leakages.
39. Food Aid tonnage is per shipping documents, not checked on arrival.
Checks elsewhere and court cases in USA against certifying agents 
suggest at least 2% to 3% shortfall.
10. Destroyed or captured by bandidos armados.
11. 'Looted' in context 'only grain in town' when non-recipient groups
are near starvation. Particularly severe problem Zambesia.
12. 'Normal' loss of 2% to 3% includes wastage, spoilage, pest damage
plus standard petty theft.
13. At end of month private retailers may sell abasticimento ration 
allocation not taken up.
14. Bakeries do sell pastry presumably largely baked from diverted flour 
intended for bread.
15. From delivery from port to users cited in Uses.
16. Normal loss 2% - see Note 12.
17. All items other than intended uses.
18. Deducts - Never Received, War, Disorder, Legal Abasticimento Sales, 
'Normal' Port/Distribution 55,000 - 87,500.
4Table 3
Abastaclmento vs Free Market Prices 
(as % of free market)
1 . Calculated from USAID Accounting Prices1 50 60
2. Market Observation2 Yellow Maize 100 - 125
White Maize 75 85
Rice 60 70
3. Calculated from Commercial CIF3 White Maize 75 90
Rice 85 - 105
Notes
Observations scattered over 1989-91. Not strictly comparable.
1. From various AID reports. AID accounting prices c.i.f. Maputo 50% to 
70% above estimated Argentine (maize) and Thai (rice) f.o.b. prices 
plus if to c.i.f. Maputo.
2. Variable margins. Yellow maize nominal as virtually unsaleable for 
human consumption in non-drought years.
3. Adjusting for margin above commercial c.i.f in USAID accounting 
prices. Varies, broadly abastacimento price is nearest commercial 
c.i.f plus distribution when set but declines, broadly with downward 
currency float, until next pricing. Presumably there are also 
seasonal and regional fluctuations but observations are neither 
numerous nor accurate enough to map these.
5Probable Orban Food Market Composition
(tonnes - grain equivalent)
Table 4
Imported
Abastacimento and Relatives1
Legal Retransfer from Abastacimento
Bread
Pastry2
Commercial Imports3 
Losses from Food Aid4 
Imported Sub-Total
Domestic 
Zonas Verdes 
Rural Commercialised5 
Domestic Sub-Total 
Total Market5
100,000 - 125,000 (12%)
10,000 - 20 000 (2%)
67,500 - 90,000 (9%)
7,500 - 10,000 (1%)
100,000 - 150,000 (14%)
45,000 - 55,000 (5%)
330,000 - 450,000 (44%)
87,500 112,500 (11%)
350,000 450,000 (45%)
437,500 562,500 (56%)
767,500 - 1,012,500 (100%)
Notes
Basically derived from Tables 1 and 2.
1. Perhaps 20% is resold on free market by recipients trading down from
rice to maize or grain to cassava and "leaves".
2. Diverted wheat flour intended for bread.
3. Legal (apart from import/sales tax evasion) but overwhelmingly 
unrecorded border traffic, second window financed.
4. Excludes not received-war-disorder losses and legal transfer from
abastacimento, pastry. Assumes 2% wastage-spoilage-pest damage (very 
low). Urban/rural division of remaining losses assumed to be about 
2:1. Re-including pastry raises total to 62,500 - 85,000 (8%).
5. Includes all food (not grain only) and all channels (not only Agricon
network). Agricon grain about 100,000 of this total and private 
market grain perhaps of same order of magnitude.
6. Excludes household self-provisioning (about 50,000 tonnes), food aid
to urban institutions (25,000-40,000) and urban food for work (under
5,000).
1991-92 Drought Losaes/1992-93 Added Aid Requirements
Table 5
a. Low Estimate
Urban Production1 
Household Consumed 
Commercialised
Rural Production1 
Household Consumed 
Commercialised 
Total Output Loss2
10,000 (20%)
30,000 (40%)
525.000 (25%)
200.000 (40%)
40,000
725.000
765.000
b. High Estimate3
Urban Production1 
Household Consumed 
Commercialised
Rural Production1 
Household Consumed 
Commercialised 
Total Output Loss2
12,500 (25%) 
40,000 (40%)
52,500
630.000 (30%)
325.000 (65%)
955,000
1,007,500
c. Food Requirement/Availability
i. Low Estimate
Requirement 4,500,000 (100%)
Supply at 500,000 tonnes
Food Aid 2,485,000 (55%)
Deficit 2,015,000 (45%)
ii. High Estimate 
Requirement 
Supply at 500,000 
Food Aid 
Deficit
Notes
Division between household consumed and commercialised speculative. In 
some districts there will be small surpluses; in Zonas Verdes 
commercialised vegetables are more attractive than self-consumed grain; 
even in deficit zones non-food basic needs (e.g. clothes, fuel and 
light, medical fees) will lead to some food crop sales.
Supply loss also includes 125,000 tonnes of commercial imports (see
Table 4) probably unavailable because of drought in all adjacent 
states.
Other estimates of output loss appear to go as high as 75% nationally 
but also appear to be overinfluenced by decline in the small officially 
marketed sector as opposed to (legal) unofficial and household self­
provisioning sectors and to overweight grain relative to cassava and 
"non-staple" food.
4,500,000 (100%)
2.242.500 (50%)
2.257.500 (50%)
7NOTE: Tables prepared by Professor R. H. Green of IDS (Sussex) in March 
1992. Estimations are his personal judgements and responsibility 
and are not to be assumed to represent the official position of 
the Seguranza Alimentar or Directorat Nacional do Plano of the 
Republic of Mozambique.
